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Constructive Technology Assessment
and Technology Dynamics:
The Case of Clean Technologies
Johan W. Schot
University of Twente
A synthesis of neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary, sociological, and historical coevolution-
ary models could be used for constructive technology assessment, aimed at the active
management of the process of technological change. This article proposes a synthetic
quasi-evolutionary model, in which variation and selection are neither independent nor
coincidental processes. Variation and selection are linked by actors, resulting in the actor
role labeled technological nexus. On the basis of the quasi-evolutionary approach, three
constructive technology assessment strategies are proposed: stimulating alternative
variations, changing the selection environment, and creating or utilizing technological
nexus. The usefulness of these concepts is demonstrated for the case of clean technolo-
gies. Ultimately, a conscious application of these strategies could result in a new actor
role for government as a creative social regulator of technological change.
By tradition, technology assessment (TA) has had an early warning
function. Through providing information as to any conceivable adverse
effects of a given technology, TA should give society time to reflect upon
them and take appropriate measures. In recent years TA has been given other
functions. For example, TA serves to support government’s strategic technol-
ogy policy by organizing discussion between various interested groups and
organizations about possible impacts, both negative and positive.’
All these functions of TA share a specific perspective on technology,
characterized by drawing a dividing line between technology on the one side
and the effects of technology on the other. Technologies are presented as
alternative options, for example, solar energy versus nuclear energy. TA is
therefore helpful in decision making and in organizing the debates leading
AUTHOR’S NOTE: For comments and suggestions on earlier drafts, I am indebted to Bas de
Laat, Jacxlneline Cramer, Frits Prakke, Dany Jacobs, Tom Misa, and Arie Rip.
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up to decisions. Recently, however, another form of TA has developed,
Constructive TA (CTA). Whereas traditional TA focuses more on the external
effects of a technology and the choice between different technological
options, the new field of CTA shifts attention to the steering of the internal
development of the technology.’ CTA is based on the idea that during the
course of technological development, choices are constantly being made
about the form, the function, and the use of that technology and, conse-
quently, that technological development can be steered to a certain extent.3
This idea can be supported by a large number of studies made within the field
of sociology and history of technology that show that technologies do not
develop as a result of some inner logic but, rather, as the function of a complex
set of social, economic, technical, and political factors. For attempts to steer
technology, the problem then is, How can this complexity be made manage-
able, and in such a way that practical instruments for public policymaking
can be developed to influence technological developments? I think that
recent studies of technological development offer concepts that make the
complexity manageable. The aim of this article is to argue this point, to
illustrate it for the case of clean technologies, and to draw some general
conclusions.
The article proceeds as follows. The next section analyses recent neo-
Schumpeterian economics and sociological and historical theories on tech-
nical change, in order to find and exploit possibilities for CTA. The term
technology dynamics will be used for these three areas of study. I then dis-
cuss these possibilities using the promotion of clean technology as an ex-
ample. The final section outlines a new role for government in technology
development.
Constructive Technology Assessment
and Technology Dynamics
In mainstream neoclassical economic thinking, technology is seen as an
exogenous factor: The moment a specific technology is required, it can
simply be taken down from the shelf. Neo-Schumpeterian economists object
to this view. They wish to make technological development an endogenous
part of their models. This implies that the interaction between technological
and economic development must be taken into account. The model must offer
sufficient scope for the continuous change and mutual adjustment of the
economy and technology (for a recent overview of neo-Schumpeterian eco-
nomics, see Dosi et al. 1988; Dosi 1988).
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Sociology and history of technology attempt to unravel the interaction
between technological and societal development. Discussion in these disci-
plines has focused on dichotomies: an internal versus external approach or
content versus context.’’ Many analysts simply declare internal and external
factors complementary to one another without clarifying how that comple-
mentarity and interaction should be conceptualized.
Consequently, empirical studies often contain a detailed description of
technological development, supplemented with a list of those factors that had
an influence on this development. As Law observes (1987a, 411): &dquo;One is
presented with a balance sheet with society (or the economy, or science, or
politics) on the one hand and technology on the other. Analysis becomes the
study of transfers between columns.&dquo;
Recently, several general models have been developed within the disci-
plines of sociology and history of technology that focus on the modeling of
integration between content and context, for instance, the systems approach
(Hughes 1983; Staudenmaier 1985), social constructivism (Bijker et al.
1987), and the actor network approach (Latour 1987; Callon 1986). These
approaches do not differentiate a priori between content and context. Their
close interrelation is referred to by the metaphor seamless web. It is not my
intention to discuss these models at full length. Instead I ask which points of
departure the neo-Schumpeterian and the new sociological and historical
models-in short, technology dynamics-offer to help identify possibilities
to steer the development of technology.
The Relation between Variation and Selection
The neo-Schumpeterian approach can be taken as the starting point for a
theory of technological development that offers viable possibilities for CTA.
Neo-Schumpeterian economists conceptualize technological change as evo-
lutionary. Since technological development is a search process involving trial
and error and uncertainty, and various options are implemented and evalu-
ated, it can be conceptualized as a sequence of variation and selection pro-
cesses. Variations are by no means tried out purely at random during the
search process; heuristics are deployed. Heuristics are guidelines (rules of
thumb) that promise, but do not guarantee, finding solutions to problems.
Employing heuristics reduces the uncertainty inherent in the search process.
The presence of heuristics implies that technological developments follow
quite specific directions, while other possible directions are ignored.’
Selection between variations occurs in two ways: ex ante and ex post.
Ex post selection obtains when the products and processes produced by
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heuristics are exposed to market-selection pressures. The social-Darwinist
principle of &dquo;survival of the fittest&dquo; plays a major role here. Variation is
stochastic or random; in other words, generation is independent of selection.
Ex ante selection implies that influence is exerted on the generation of
variations and thus on the shaping and the choice of heuristics. This form of
selection takes place when firms anticipate possible selection by the market.
Neo-Schumpeterian economists use the term selection environment instead
of the term market (Nelson and Winter 1977, 49). The term selection
environment covers not only the neoclassic concept of market (structure and
size of supply and demand, prices) but also various institutional (rules, rela-
tion between employers and employees, political structure) and geographical
factors. Van den Belt and Rip (1987,141) pointed out that anticipation occurs
not only on the basis of market indicators but also on the basis of expectations
with regard to favorable search directions. A given research program is con-
tinued on the basis of promised future success.
Analysts using the new sociological and historical approaches typically
deny the presence of independent selection. These analysts begin by refusing
to distinguish rigorously between the social (including economic) and the
technological realms. They fiercely oppose a dual repertoire using different
concepts for analyzing the content of technological development and the
influence of the surrounding environment on this technological development.
They emphasize that the content of technological development is shaped
simultaneously with the context. Each variation has a script or scenario
(Akrich 1987, 3) that, in addition to the technical aspects, also includes
aspects of the surrounding environment. Callon (1986), for example, showed
how Electricite de France engineers, early in the 1970s, simultaneously
designed not only an electrically driven car but also the total environment in
which that car should function. Government regulation, the research pro-
grams, and the production of car manufacturers all had to be changed. This
meant that engineers would be involved not only with the technical aspects
(batteries, fuel cells, etc.) but also with the economic (cost, financing) and
political aspects, precisely those elements referred to as the selection envi-
ronment in the neo-Schumpeterian approach.
For this reason those who develop technology need to be &dquo;heterogeneous
engineers&dquo; (Law 1987b, 113). They are responsible not only for the technical
realization of their design but also for the &dquo;social&dquo; side. In other words, they
have to recruit a whole range of heterogeneous elements in order to realize
their design. In short, these analysts made no mention of independent vari-
ation and selection, the materials of the evolutionary model, but rather stress,
in my words, the coevolution of both technology and selection environment.’
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The coevolutionary model yields a significant advantage over the eco-
nomic model, in which little attention is given to the influence of variation
process on the selection environment. Sociological and historical studies
have shown that social, political, and economic factors are embedded, as it
were, in technological development. Successful variations also change the
selection environment. Contrary to the neo-Schumpeterian approach, there-
fore, more justice must be done to the influence exerted by the variation pro-
cess on the selection process. Sociological and historical models, however,
wrongly deny any independence of the selection environment. Certain con-
textual factors do exert an influence on the content of scripts that are orches-
trated and on the further realization of those scripts, without actually being
changed themselves. There is, therefore, a hard, structured selection environ-
ment that exerts an influence on variations that manifest themselves by block-
ing certain variations and encouraging others in their further development.’
Actors may link variation with selection processes in three ways. First,
actors (firms, for instance) may anticipate later selection from the selection
environment by adjusting heuristics. This is what Dosi (1982, 156) referred
to as ex ante selection.
Second, institutional links may be created between the variation process
and the selection process. These links mediate between environmental re-
quirements and technological opportunities and constraints. I would like to
introduce the term technological nexus for these links.8 The nexus role should
not be interpreted as a passive one, taking stimuli from the selection envi-
ronment and adapting the variation process. The nexus role implies consid-
ering both the selection and the variation process as a resource and an option:
that is, activities that can and must be molded and harmonized through active
efforts. The activities of a technological nexus result in a learning process,
which takes place both in the firm, a place where an important part of the
variation process is located, and in its environment. This environment in-
cludes a broad range of actors - among others, the actors on the market
(competitors, customers), government institutions, labor unions, and banks.
In the economic literature one determinant of successful innovation has been
stressed again and again: a firm’s capacity to link technical and market
opportunities (Freeman 1982,11). This implies that technological nexus play
a vital role.
Douglas (1985), following Aitken, suggested that individuals, whom she
calls translators, transfer information between differently oriented and some-
times antagonistic sectors of society. Such people are &dquo;bilingual in that they
understand the language and demands of more than one realm&dquo; (p. 121). My
concept of technological nexus comes very close to the concept of translator.
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The difference is that the term technological nexus is more specific, because
it denotes a specific function (within a firm) bringing variation and selection
processes together. Allen (1977, 141) introduces the term technological
gatekeeper. The gatekeeper mediates between technological needs of orga-
nizations and results of technological and scientific research done elsewhere.
The difference between a gatekeeper and a nexus is that a nexus carries and
shapes the interaction between environmental (societal and market) require-
ments and technological opportunities, whereas a gatekeeper focuses on
mediating between technological needs and opportunities. Within the theo-
retical organization literature, the importance of what are called boundary-
spanning roles in an organization is indicated (see Aldrich and Herker 1977).
These boundary-spanning roles contain the functional linkages between the
organization and its environment. The function of these linkages is to enhance
the organization’s capacity to deal more effectively with environmental
variability and uncertainty. The concept of boundary-spanning role is cer-
tainly in line with the concept of technological nexus, but here again the
nexus concept is more specific, aiming at the relation between research and
development (variation) and environmental (selection) requirements.
Thus the difference between analogous concepts proposed in the literature
and the concept of technological nexus is that the latter is in most cases more
specific, describing the relation between technological variation and envi-
ronmental selection. The examples of analogous concepts show, however,
that the phenomenon of the technological nexus is not an isolated one. Rather
it is one example of a much more general class of phenomena. An additional
argument for using the term technological nexus is that it fits nicely into the
chosen evolutionary terminology.
A third way actors link variation with selection is by attempting to create
a niche to protect variation (and expectations in respect of variation) against
selection that could be too rapid and draconic. Rip (1989, 25) labels this
phenomenon strategic niche management. This protected niche can be
diminished in stages. Firms do this by phased research and development via
tests, upgrading of tests, trial production, and production.
In short, combining the valuable aspects of the evolution and coevolution
models, we might, following Rip (1989, 7), devise what could be called a
quasi-evolutionary model. In this combined model, variation and selection
are neither independent nor coincidental processes. Selection may be antic-
ipated or temporarily excluded or attenuated in the variation process. Fur-
thermore, institutional links exist between variation and selection. As I shall
demonstrate, these technological nexus offer powerful possibilities for di-
recting technological development.
 at Universiteit Twente on April 5, 2013sth.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
42
The Role of Actors in Technological Development
The quasi-evolutionary model shows that we can distinguish analytically
among three types of actors:
1. Actors who are directly involved in the formulation of objectives and heuris-
tics. By doing this they determine the content of variation generation. Good
examples of this are company research and development departments and
technological institutes funded by the government.
2. Actors who attempt selectively to influence the variations from outside in
order to obtain desired effects. These are actors who do not formulate the
objectives of technology development themselves. Good examples are gov-
ernment bodies that try to force technological change by way of environmental
regulations and certain environmentalists who attempt to do the same by
political action.
3. Actors who couple variation and selection: the technological nexus. These are
departments or individuals who, on one hand, translate demands made from
within the selection environment into recommendations or objectives for
technological development and who, on the other hand, impose the demands
made by certain technological variations on the selection environment.
An example could be environmental departments in firms. Whether such
departments actually fulfill the function of the technological nexus needs to
be determined. At present environmental departments play only a minor role
in the development of new products. Thus they do not have the nexus function
of translating regulatory and other &dquo;green demands&dquo; from the market into
criteria for product innovation.
Stimulating Clean Technologies
One of the central problems the world currently faces is environmental
pollution. Research data have shown that the environment is in an alarming
state. The release of pollutants will have to be reduced by 70% to 90%, and
energy consumption will have to be halved. In order to solve these enormous
environmental problems, environmental technology, especially clean tech-
nology, has been earmarked to play an important part. Consequently, the
stimulation of clean technology is one of the spearheads of Dutch and the
European Economic Community’s environmental and technology policy.
Environmental technology comprises all the techniques, processes, and
products that are of importance in preventing or reducing the burden on the
environment. An extremely broad range of processes and products is in-
volved. A distinction can be made between clean and end-of-pipe (or add-on)
technologies. The essence of the end-of-pipe technology approach is to treat
the residuals the production process generates but to leave the production
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process unchanged. The residuals are modified, so that they are less noxious,
easier to store, or reusable 9 In contrast, clean technologies alter the produc-
tion process, the inputs into the process, or the product itself in such a way
that it generates a smaller amount of the same or a different, less noxious,
residual. The Commission of the European Communities defines clean
technologies as &dquo;any technical measures taken in various industries to reduce
or even eliminate at source the production of any nuisance, pollution or waste,
and to help to save raw materials, natural resources and energy.&dquo;&dquo;
So far the implementation of environmental policy by governments of
industrialized countries has led mainly to innovations in end-of-pipe tech-
nology. Innovations in clean technology are lagging behind. An important
policy problem is, consequently, how to achieve a more effective way to
stimulate the innovation of clean technologies or, in other words, alter current
technological development in which environmental aspects of new processes
and products have been largely disregarded.
The quasi-evolutionary model described in the previous section suggests
three general CTA strategies to alter current lines of technological develop-
ment (innovation as well as diffusion):
1. the development of alternative variations
2. modification of the selection environment
3. the creation or utilization of technological nexus.
The following sections elaborate these strategies and discuss how govern-
ments use them. The examples focus on Dutch experiences, but, where
possible, I compare them with the experiences of other European countries.
The Development ofAlternative Variations
Governments can try to develop alternative variations (technologies),
based on their own goals, which are not developed in the market. For ex-
ample, in the field of energy, the Dutch government financed alternative
technologies such as wind and solar energy. To guarantee the quality of labor,
in Sweden the government in cooperation with unions developed a different
human-machine interface for graphic technology (Leydesdorff and Van den
Besselaar 1987, 153). These alternative technologies, however, have had
great difficulty surviving the commercialization stage, when market forces
start to operate. Governments are badly equipped to manage the process of
technological innovation up to the phase of market introduction. This is true
even for commercialization of technologies arising from research performed
under government contracts not aimed at reaching specific societal goals but
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aimed at stimulating areas like information technology and biotechnology
(Supapol 1990). The study of technology dynamics clearly illustrates the
reason for this. The selection environment is not receptive to alternative
forms of technology, implying that for successful commercialization of
technology, the selection environment (infrastructure, competitiveness, etc.)
also needs to be changed. That is an arduous road to take, to say the least.&dquo;
Not even the French engineers Callon describes were successful in this task.
It is quite clear that these changes cannot be forced by funding alone.
Another way to stimulate clean technology is to make subsidies available.
Instead of trying to finance alternative innovations, this is an attempt to steer
existing innovation processes within firms in the desired direction. In the
Netherlands a clean technology program was launched in 1975. This program
allowed industries and research institutes to apply for financial aid to develop
clean technologies. Until 1990 more than two hundred cleaner projects were
funded. Evaluation studies showed, however, that only a small part of the
subsidies were actually spent on clean technologies. Furthermore, most of
the subsidies went to larger firms that would have made the required invest-
ments even in the absence of such subsidies (Cramer et al. 1990).
Dutch experiences, as well as those of other European countries, show
that the system of subsidies is far too weak an instrument by itself to provoke
clean technology. Financial aid programs have mainly led to the development
of end-of-pipe technologies, leaving the dominant polluting technological
trajectories unchanged (Magat 1979; Hartje and Lurie 1985; Organization
for Economic Change and Development [OECD] 1985). A short comment
must be made on this. The provision of subsidies may provide an incentive
for the promotion of clean technologies, if used in combination with other
instruments. If, because of strict standards, firms are forced to implement
clean technology, subsidies could serve to minimize the economic risks and
the resistance against the severity of the standards.
Changing the Selection Environment
In setting and issuing regulations, the government influences a firm’s
selection environment. Governments make use of a wide range of instru-
ments, the most important of which are imposing standards and levying
charges. As I just mentioned, in general, implementing these instruments has
led to the application of end-of-pipe technology (OECD 1985; Cramer et al.
1990). There are two reasons for this. First, it is frequently easy for firms to
meet the requirements without having to alter their production technologies.
The standards and charges have never been strict enough to have had a
technology-forcing effect. Second, regulations have been aimed mainly at
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resolving acute environmental problems, and quick solutions were given
preference. Thus the stimulation of clean technologies was primarily a
derivative of a general environmental policy and not of a specific technology-
forcing policy.
In terms of the model presented in the last section, we may assume that
the policy instruments used have had mainly an ex post selection effect. In
their technology development, firms rarely anticipate regulation, thus there
is a lack of ex ante selection. Such ex ante selection is a prerequisite for the
development of clean technology. To increase the ex ante effect, the setting
of regulations should be adapted more toward the way variations are gener-
ated in firms. For example, factors such as certainty in the long term and
phasing are most important in technology development. This means that the
government could set very strict standards, so stringent that technology
needed to comply with those standards is not yet available. However, the
standards must be set and remain unchanged for a long period of time, as
well as be introduced in progressive stages. The government should also be
flexible in its implementation and sometimes make allowances for transgres-
sion over certain periods. Yet as far as the goal to be achieved is concerned,
it must be unrelenting and unambiguous (see also Ashford, Ayers, and Stone
1985). Changing the selection environment through regulation will be par-
ticularly successful if regulations are designed in such a way that the
management of firms is able to anticipate them and thus bring about ex ante
selection pressure.
Further refinement and adaptation of the set of instruments is necessary
but not sufficient to stimulate the development and application of clean
technology. Decisions whether or not to invest in clean technologies will
depend on many factors and actors, of which government environmental
regulation is just one. One of the big obstacles in the way of developing clean
technology at present is that the government is more or less the only actor in
the selection environment who tries to impose environmental requirements.
Government strategy should therefore be aimed toward encouraging other
actors in the selection environment also to set environmental requirements.
Such requirements should, in fact, form a regular part of market transactions
between companies and, for example, banks and insurance companies.
At this point I would like to give three examples of actors who are part of
the selection environment and who could set environmental requirements
on companies: insurance companies, manufacturers’ associations, and user
companies.’2 Insurance companies are increasingly looking for ways to
abandon their restrictive policies with respect to environmental risks. Until
recently, they relied on defensive strategies, unwilling to offer coverage for
damage caused by gradual pollution and trying to restrict liability. In the
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Netherlands in 1985 a group of fifty-two insurers set up a separate company
for the purpose of jointly investigating the (impossibilities of exploiting the
new market of environmental risk. This company uses a special risk assess-
ment procedure, which includes technical and organizational factors. On the
basis of this assessment, insurance companies are able to require preventive
measures.
If insurers start to develop this market in more depth, they are certain to
impose various requirements, coupled with checks and inspections, on how
companies behave with respect to pollution risks. Insurance companies could
require reductions of risks and especially the use of preventive measures and
clean technology. The government could speed up this process by tightening
up liability legislation and introducing strict liability. In that case evidence
of causation and actual damage is enough; negligence on the part of the
producer (of waste or a product) need not be proven. Among European
countries strict liability is still the exception, but this is changing. Another
possibility to stimulate the insurance market is to make use of financial
responsibility regulations, that is, requirements that a firm either purchase
insurance to cover risk or meet financial requirements to become a self-
insurer. Irresponsible firms that do not care to reduce or control their pollution
will not be able to purchase insurance, or the cost will be outrageously high
because of the exposure (see Ashford, Moran, and Stone 1989).
Manufacturers associations are exerting more and more pressure on their
members to comply with government regulations. Scandals have an adverse
effect on the image of the whole branch. Attempts are often made at industrial
branch levels to achieve a single line of policy. Manufacturers associations,
for instance, the Chemical Manufacturers Association in the United States
are even starting to force their members to follow common policy under
threat of expulsion. This works because firms prefer to be recognized as full
and responsible members, rather than as irresponsible &dquo;cowboy firms.&dquo;
Another way in which firms exert pressure on one another is via their
supplier-user contacts. At the moment several end users of chemicals are
imposing environmental demands- on their suppliers. For instance, firms
within the food-packaging industry are asking for plastics without PVC;
firms in the automobile industry are demanding plastics that can be recycled
more easily; and a company like 3M is developing an inventory control
program to minimize waste, for instance, asking suppliers to deliver their
materials in returnable or reusable containers or to purchase only the quantity
of material needed for a specific production run, so that no material is left
over to put into storage (Hunter 1989). Moreover, several firms have indi-
cated that they will develop a more systematic environmental purchase
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policy. They intend to make a standard checklist to be used by their purchas-
ing departments and ask suppliers to deliver their products with data on
environmental risks included.
It is not the case that users are making demands on suppliers only. Several,
mainly large, suppliers have anticipated these kinds of pressures by develop-
ing product stewardship programs. These programs include provision of
information on safety and environmental aspects and provide assistance
through giving training seminars. In this way suppliers are able to improve
their competitive edge (Baram, Dillon, and Stone 1990, 69). The advantage
of this trend is that pressure is exerted on medium-sized and small firms to
produce with less pollution. This is a category of firm that the government
by itself has difficulty in reaching.
Governments could take several measures to encourage this trend. What
is important here again is long-term goal setting, making it possible and
rewarding to anticipate the implementation of strict standards. One of the
important obstacles for user firms to developing an environmentally friendly
purchasing policy is the absence of information on the environmental quality
of the supplied products. The government could provide this information, for
instance, by developing a data base or going a step further by stimulating the
development of a certification system for environmentally friendly prod-
ucts -not only for consumer products, as already is the case in Germany, for
instance, but for intermediate products as well. In short, the government
could change the selection environment in two ways to achieve a greater
technology-forcing effect in the direction of clean technology. First, the ex
post effect of existing environmental regulation must be changed to an ex
ante effect. Second, the government could stimulate the incorporation of en-
vironmental requirements in the selection environment. Environmental re-
quirements would then become part of regular market transactions.
Creation or Utilization of Technological Nexus
The improved and broader selection pressures from the selection environ-
ment will not necessarily result in clean technologies. To achieve this,
requirements arising in the selection environment need to be linked with
investment decisions taken in companies. This is a task for the technology
nexus. The government should therefore attempt either to create such nexus
or to utilize existing ones. This is a strategy that up to now has not been
exploited in a systematic way either in the Netherlands or in the rest of
Europe. I will discuss three examples of technological nexus that could be
utilized by the government:
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1. marketing departments and other actors sensitive to public (or credibility)
pressure
2. environmental departments
3. quality assurance departments.
A firm’s marketing department has the task of making use of market signals
to formulate the business view of technological opportunities and connect
this view to the research strategy of the company. Marketing departments are
sensitive to indicators from the market and also to public pressure. They are
in a position to exploit the growing trend of green consumerism by translating
this trend into opportunities for product development and encouraging the
trend itself by marketing the resulting new products. For example, Volvo
translated diffuse public pressure for safety into a specific design and sales
strategy for safe cars. Moreover, this forced other car manufacturers either
to give more attention to aspects of safety or lose credibility (Svenson 1988).
In the chemical industry, credibility is increasingly experienced as a problem.
Credibility is no longer connected only with emission and possible disaster
but with the products (like PVC or CFCs) of the chemical industry as well.
The concern for credibility is apparent from the attention given to the
environmental risks of products and processes in the annual reports of
individual companies. The sensitivity of firms to publicity has turned out to
be a powerful weapon in the hands of environmentalists. They are able by
targeting certain products to influence actual use by the consumer. In order
to regain the credibility of their operations and products, chemical industries
are increasingly changing their practices, realizing that credibility is directly
tied to performance. A well-known example of this in the Netherlands was
Duphar, whose image had suffered enormous damage after containers con-
taminated with dioxin had been discovered. This company launched a major
publicity program to improve its image, but, more important, the company
developed a program to improve its risk management practices as well.
It is clear that environmental aspects of products and processes offer
companies new opportunities in the field of marketing and public relations,
but at same time they form a threat to sales figures. Governments can en-
courage this trend by improving the articulation of the still quite diffuse
pressure from environmentalists, the public, and the consumer by providing
more information about the environmental quality of products and by intro-
ducing green labels. Another opportunity is connecting the public credibility
pressure more directly to the companies themselves, by creating specific in-
formation and risk communication obligations. American experiences indi-
cate that the pressure to adopt cleaner production technologies is increased
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if a company starts to communicate with its immediate neighbors (Baram,
Dillon, and Ruffle 1990, 77).
A second example of technological nexus is formed by the environmental
departments of larger companies. In the Dutch situation this is an example
that shows how government policy can frustrate the genesis of desirable
nexus between variation and selection. Environmental protection is increas-
ingly regarded as a separate function in companies. Institutionalization of the
environmental function takes place, and the outcome is that responsibilities
are defined for environmental protection within a company. Responsibilities
become more clearly structured, and more is written down as well. A tentative
professionalization of environmental officers emerges. Slowly a shift is be-
coming apparent in the tasks of environmental departments. Three tasks are
emerging:
monitoring: checking whether internal and external rules are observed, instruc-
tion and training are given, and emissions, waste products, and processes are
measured and recorded
external contacts: contact with government bodies, people living in the neighbor-
hood, environmentalists, and the general public
innovation and policy development: influencing the company’s strategic policy,
for example, in the construction of new factories or in deterntining research
and development strategy.
At present most time is spent on the primary monitoring task and the
subsequent contacts with government bodies. The environmental officers of
a company appear to contribute very little to the development of cleaner
products, the generation of alternatives for scarce or pollutant raw materials,
or the design of plants that would have a less adverse effect on the environ-
ment. The third task plays a very minor role in the work of environmental
officers. This is also apparent from the fact that in most cases environmental
officers have no part in a company’s strategic planning. Yet, although hesi-
tantly, changes are under way in this area. Environmental departments are
becoming more and more involved in decision making on company invest-
ments (see, for instance, Ullmann 1982, 110; Schot et al. 1991).
The Dutch government is at present taking very little advantage of this.
Government debate on environmental care within industry is focused on
the enforcement of standards. Particularly because the government is cur-
rently unable to perform its enforcement task, more emphasis is put on self-
regulation within industry. Environmental departments need to play a crucial
role here. No attention has been given, however, to working out measures
with regard to the position of environmental departments as the potential
 at Universiteit Twente on April 5, 2013sth.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
50
nexus between variation and selection. Nor are initiatives taken to strengthen
the position of environmental departments in this context. On the contrary,
because of the policy focus on enforcement of standards, the expectation is
that environmental departments will be locked into their first task through
the need to comply with government regulation. This means that the position
of environmental departments with regard to investment decision making
and research and development strategy will not be developed.
The third and last example of nexus that can be influenced are quality
assurance departments. In recent years significant changes have taken place
concerning quality assurance in companies. For many large user firms,
suppliers have to meet certain quality standards. Next to price, quality has
become an important selection criterion in the industrial market. This is part
of a larger trend within larger user firms to contract out more work to fewer
firms (Hagedoorn and Schot 1988). These firms want to build up a strong
relationship with a small number of suppliers. Part of this relationship is a
substantial upgrading of the quality standards. Suppliers who fail to comply
with the required standards of quality are simply pushed out of the market.
This applies especially to medium-sized and small firms.
Additionally, quality has started to take on a different meaning. In the
sixties and seventies quality was monitored by quality control personnel or
departments. These had the task of detecting products that failed to comply
with established standards of quality, often by carrying out random checks.
Nowadays, quality is integrated throughout the organization. The method
used to control quality has also undergone enormous change. It is no longer
a question of random checks at the start of the process, halfway through the
process, and on the finished product. Monitoring now takes place as a
continuous process. Nowadays, safety often forms part of this quality assur-
ance. This connection is made, for example, in procedural standards drawn
up in consultation between government and industry, such as good laboratory
practice, good manufacturing practice, and quality assurance control. At
present, environmental requirements play only a marginal role in these pro-
cedures. Governments could stimulate the integration of quality and envi-
ronmental requirements.
The Government as Game Regulator
In the last section, three points of departure for constructive technology
assessment in environmental policy were discussed. On the basis of differ-
entiation among the various roles of actors given in an earlier section, I
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identified three CTA strategies: the development of alternative variations, the
changing of the selection environment, and the creation or utilization of
technological nexus. These strategies were matched with the instruments
actually used to stimulate clean technologies, that is, to alter current techno-
logical trajectories in which environmental aspects have been externalized.
Governments clearly rely heavily on strategies of stimulating alternative
variations through funding and subsidies and changing selection through
regulation. Broadening the environmental selection environment to elicit the
assistance of other actors as partners in stimulating clean technologies and
making use of technological nexus have been largely neglected as strategies.
Furthermore, the strategies deployed are not oriented toward the character-
istics of technological development itself. Consequently, current heuristics
are not changed. Instead technological devices are added to existing technol-
ogies, resulting in end-of-pipe technologies.
The strategies proposed in the last section complement each other. In
addition to the necessity of larger and broader selection pressures to achieve
substantial further development of clean technology, it is also essential to
couple those pressures to technological development via the creation or
utilization of a technological nexus. Subsidies should also be deployed to
help the firms that react to the instruments to overcome the financial obstacles
they generate.
If governments elaborate these strategies, a fourth actor role will emerge
alongside the three previously described: generating variations, selecting z
variations, and linking variation and selection. This fourth role is that of
regulating the variation and selection processes. Working out the role of
regulator can to some extent fall within the scope of what was previously
said about the role of broadening the selection environment and creating or
using a nexus between variation and selection. However, some aspects of this
role go a step further. The government could define its tasks as monitoring
the course of the technology game.
In a recent OECD document this role was described as one of &dquo;socially
creative regulator of technical change&dquo; (OECD 1988, 22). This form of
regulation does not limit an actor’s freedom to take action by establishing or
issuing regulations. Rather it structures action, makes things work. The
government could take on this role by creating suitable conditions for inter-
action and feedback between the various actors.i3 The role of a creative
&dquo;game&dquo; regulator involves creating networks between actors and establishing
and enforcing the rules of the game for these networks. A good example of
this is the way the Danish government organized its subsidy program for
clean technology. The positive results of the program cannot be explained by
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the provision of money as such, but are closely connected with efforts to
ensure successful cooperation between user companies, suppliers, and con-
sultants (Georg, Jorgensen, and Ropke 1990).
Building networks and shaping rules of the game thus result in an
increasing interdependence among actors. The pressure to utilize clean
technologies-or others that the public wants but industry must be coaxed
to provide-disseminates through the system more rapidly. Third parties
form driving forces for changing the rules of the game and thus provide the
channels for influencing technology. In the longer term this could lead to
social criteria becoming an essential part of the heuristics that steer techno-
logical change.
Notes
1. See Smits and Leyten (1988) for a full account of the various functions of TA and its
institutionalization in various countries.
2. To date, this form of TA is officially promoted by the Netherlands Organization for
Technology Assessment (NOTA; see Rip 1988). Constructive technology assessment has also
been discussed sympathetically in an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
context (OECD, 1988). In a review of the functions and aims of technology assessment, Kranakis
(1988, 290) distinguishes between three practical functions: forecasting, monitoring, and con-
trol. The control function of TA incorporates two major aims: The first is to shape the character
and direction of technological development, and the second aim is to try to shape the ways and
contexts in which technologies are used. These two aims correspond to those of constructive
technology assessment.
3. An elaborate review of the arguments in the debate on technological determinism can
be found in Misa (1988).
4. See the work of Staudenmaier (1985) for an overview of discussions within the field of
history of technology. Discussion has only recently come into full swing in the sociology of
technology. Overview works include those by MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985) and Bijker,
Hughes, and Pinch (1987). A similar discussion is also under way within neo-Schumpeterian
economics in terms of technology push versus market pull. For an overview of this debate, see
Coombs, Saviotti, and Walsh (1987, chap. 5).
5. Heuristics tend to cluster around an exemplar. An exemplar may be seen as a subject
one tries to improve by applying a cluster of heuristics. The DC-3 is often cited as a perfect
example. The advent of the DC-3 aircraft in the 1930s defined a particular technological regime:
metal skin, low wing, piston-powered planes. Innovation involved better exploitation of this
regime (Nelson and Winter 1977, 57). The clustering of heuristics around an exemplar forms a
paradigm. Paradigms will not, in contrast to the assumption made by neo-Schumpeterians, occur
in all cases (see Van den Belt and Rip 1987, 140).
6. The concept of the seamless web differs between, on one hand, the social constructivist
model (Pinch and Bijker 1987) and, on the other, the actor-network and system approaches. In
social constructivism technology is formed through a process of interaction (variation and
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selection) between perceptions of relevant social groups. No technological development exists
outside the perceptions of those groups. This approach eliminates the distinction between
technological and contextual factors by seeing the whole development of the technology as a
social process. This was the reason why Law (1987b,113) accused social constructivists of social
determinism, the counterpart of technological determinism. He emphasized that the actor-
network approach, unlike social constructivism, does not give preference to any factor at all.
The development of technology is seen as a function of the interaction among heterogeneous
elements, of both technological and contextual natures. Technology itself can play a steering
role, because it functions as an active, if nonhuman, actor. In an editorial, Bijker and Pinch
(Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1987,109) defended themselves against this criticism by maintaining
that the social element, contrary to what Law suggested, has no special explanatory position.
Technology may also play an explanatory role, but it is then a socially constructed technology&mdash;
always seen through the eyes of a relevant social group. Notwithstanding Bijker and Pinch’s
counterarguments, the social constructivism approach and the actor-network approach clearly
differ. In the actor-network approach technology is developed through the interaction of elements
in a network. Dynamism results from the interaction among those elements. During develop-
ment, network formation can come up against various obstacles, both technical and social.
Technology can play an active role in overcoming these obstacles. The latter is impossible in
social constructivism, for technology does not exist outside the perceptions of social groups.
7. This does not imply that the selection environment is unchangeable. On the contrary, as
technology changes, the environment will adapt itself. The main point here is to argue that the
selection environment does have its own momentum, whereby it is able to exert influence on
technological development.
8. I have elaborated the concept of nexus introduced by Van den Belt and Rip (1987,142).
In their definition a nexus is a "social institution that carries and shapes the interaction between
[technological] trajectory and selection-environment." They give as examples the patent system 
and the application and test laboratories set up in the synthetic dye industry. My concept differs 
because it denotes a specific actor role in the variation and selection process, which actors may
or may not take on (see the section of this article on the role of actors in technological
development).
9. An extreme category is technology to deal with environmental damage done in the past.
10. See OECD (1987) for an overview of various definitions. There is no absolute contra-
distinction between clean technology and end-of-pipe technology but, rather, a sliding scale from
curative to preventive measures. Moreover, generally speaking there is no either-or choice. The
use of end-of-pipe technology will in many cases continue to be essential when using clean
technology.
11. There is one exception. New military technologies will gain a foothold because they
will be shielded from the competitive rigors of the marketplace.
12. These examples and the data given are based on a research project on the greening of
the chemical industry undertaken by the Center for Technology and Policy Studies, Apeldoorn,
The Netherlands. Whenever possible, relevant literature is mentioned in the text, otherwise the
conclusions are the result of this research project. Information has been acquired through a broad
variety of in-depth interviews with actors inside and outside chemical companies. The results
are published (see Schot et al. 1991).
13. See Bradbury (1989, 393), who proposes a similar approach for policy problems of risk:
"The priority for management is ... the development of processes of interaction."
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